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The structure and pattern of China's
economic relations with the countries in
Southeast Asia which now constitute the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), have been shaped by a range
of complex forces. Apart from such trade-
inducing structural factors as rapid eco-
nomic growth and economic complemen-
tarity, history and geography have played
a distinctive part in China's economic
relations with the ASEAN region. Tradi-
tionally, "Southeast Asia" as a broadly
defined geographical region lying to the
south of China across a wide expanse of
the South China Sea, was referred to as
Nanyang (or literally "south sea") by the
Chinese. China's relations with the in-
dividual states in the Nanyang have
naturally been extensive, with a strong
root in the past.
China's early contacts with the in-
dividual states in the ASEAN region can
be traced back to ancient times, even
though significant relations in terms of
more substantive trade flows were to
occur much later, after the influx of
Chinese migrants into the region. Nu-
* Department of Economics, National University
of Singapore, Kent Ridge, Singapore 0511
merous historical records can serve to
show that by the Sung Dynasty (960-
1280) Imperial China had already es-
tablished firm tributary relations with
many states in the region, with Chinese
traders frequenting Java, Borneo, Ma-
lacca and the Philippine archipelagoes.
Chinese maritime activities in the Nanyang
culminated in the famous expeditions by
Admiral Zheng He (Cheng Ho) in the
15th century [Ho Ping-Yin 1935 ;
Purcell 1965] .
Much of the early Chinese commercial
involvement with the Nanyang stemmed
directly or indirectly from the traditional
tribute system which was in fact the main
diplomatic vehicle by which Imperial
China conducted its inter-state relations
with the non-Chinese societies in ac-
cordance with its concept of "Chinese
world order."l) The tribute-bearing mis-
sions were also convenient "cloak for
trade" [Fairbank 1953: 32]. They were,
however, never intended to be a device
with which China would seek to impose
political and economic domination over
its weaker Southern neighbours. There
was simply no political incentive nor the
economIC imperative for the Chinese
Imperial Court to mount such costly
I) See Fairbank [1968], especially Wang
Gungwu [ibid.].
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colonizing undertaking. It is therefore no
coincidence that historically none of the
present six ASEAN states had ever been
under Chinese rule. Except for Singapore
by virtue of the preponderance of its
ethnic Chinese population, these societies
did not even fall into the so-called Chinese
cuIture area in the sense of being in-
fluenced by the mainstream Chinese
civilization as contained in the Confucian
system of government, as did Korea or
Vietnam.
I t is not only that China's early con-
tacts with the various states in the Nanyang
did not lead to outright Chinese domi-
nation of the region. But also, Chinese
early commercial activities in the region,
though brisk at times, were basically small
in scale and represented largely unco-
ordinated individual efforts, nothing com-
parable to the level of operations later
mounted by the much more enterprising
European powers, which sought to sys-
tematically colonize the region for the
purposes of controlling raw materials
supplies and securing market outlets for
their manufactured produCts. In contrast,
traditional China, with a static economy
of high self-sufficiency (the so-called
"high-level equilibrium trap"2») and re-
inforced by the anti-commercial prejudice
of Confucianism, was simply not oriented
towards any serious economic interaction
with the outside.
By the middle of the 19th century
Western imperialism spread to the shore
of China, which was itself forced to open
2) For further discussion of this concept, see
Elvin [1953].
its door to Western trade and influence.
Meanwhile, the Chinese, mainly from the
coastal provices of Guangdong and
Fujian, began to flock to Southeast Asia in
large numbers in order to escape political
chaos and economic hardship at home.
To be sure, Chinese settlements were
already well established in various parts
of Southeast Asia before the arrival of the
Europeans. As the Europeans later
colonized the Southeast Asian states and
developed their mining and plantation
sectors, a large number of hard-working
labourers were in demand, which could
not be met by indigenous sources. This
operated as a "pull" force for the influx
of the Chinese immigrants to the region.
The Chinese immigrants were usually
put in the intermediate position under the
Western colonial structure (e.g. the Dutch
"Culture System" in Indonesia), being
segregated from both the ruling elite and
the indigenous population. While the
Chinese were barred from participating
in the modern sector activities such as
plantation agriculture, mines, finance and
export trade, which were dominated by
the Europeans, they were also prohibi-
tated from owning and cultivating land.
The openings left for them were in retail
trade, money-lending and other mid-
dleman roles, which did not endear them
later to the local people once they ob-
tained their independence. The nation-
alists, in particular, tended to view
the ethnic Chinese as handmaidens of
Western colonialism. The problem was
further aggravated by the slow process
of assimilation of the Chinese into their
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host countries, partly because of the
strong propensity of the Chinese to main-
tain their cultural identity and partly due
to some religious obstacles, e.g. the
difficulty of the Chinese to adopt the
Muslim religion. 3)
Admittedly, an exception can be made
for the Chinese in Thailand which, not
being a colony before and having intro-
duced no colonial policy of polarizing the
Chinese from the local population, had
therefore been much more successful in
integrating its ethnic Chinese into the
mainstream of the Thai society. The
process of assimilation was also facilitated
by the closer racial and religious affinity
between the Chinese and the Thai. None-
theless, it is true that Thailand IS
almost alone among the ASEAN states
today which does not face a "problem"
from its Chinese minority mainly because
it has not subjected them to prolonged
economic and social alienation.
Suffice it to say that the conspicous
presence of the ethnic Chinese com-
munities in Southeast Asia today con-
stitutes the most lasting legacies of the
centuries-old contacts between China and
various states in the region. Historically
the ethnic Chinese had made a distinct
contribution to the economic progress of
the states in Southeast Asia. As mostly
merchants and entrepreneurs, the Chinese
in Southeast Asia were also instrumental
in the development and expansion of the
two-way trade between China and South-
3) For further discussion of the overseas Chinese
in Southeast Asia, see Purcell [1965]. This is
still the best work on this subject. See also,
Lim and Gosling [1983].
east Asia. But in modern times they had
also presented problems to China by
complicating its overall relations with the
region. During the 1950s and the 1960s,
the "overseas Chinese" issue frequently
cropped up to precipitate a diplomatic
confrontation between China and Indo-
nesia. Today it is still a thorny problem
that could potentially poison China's
existing relations with Indonesia and
Malaysia. Particularly in Indonesia, anti-
Chinese sentiments have been so deep-
seated that outbreaks of anti-Chinese riots
were frequently touched off by small
incidents, and the last one to flare up was
as recent as in the early 1980s. In fact,
Jakarta has often made use of the "over-
seas Chinese" issue as one of the official
excuses to rationalize its delay in nor-
malizing relations with Beijing.4)
By comparison, the Philippines and
Thailand have successfully tackled their
ethnic Chinese problem through assimi-
lation so that it no longer stands in the
way of their bilateral relations with
China. Over the years China has also
taken serious steps to defuse the "over-
seas Chinese" issue as a political liability
in its foreign policy. Chinese leaders
visiting the ASEAN region have always
urged the ethnic Chinese to take up
citizenship of their residence and abide
by local laws. In setting up diplomatic
relations with the individual ASEAN
countries, Beijing has also made a point of
stressing that Chinese government would
no longer consider those ethnic Chinese
4) For a good discussion of the Chinese in Indo-
nesia, see Mackie [1976: introduction]. Also,
Suryadinata [1978].
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who have taken up local citizenship to
be Chinese nationals. More significantly,
the Chinese National People's Congress
passed a new citzenship law in September
1980, to the effect that "no dual nation-
ality will be recognized for any Chinese
national. "5) In legally preventing over-
seas Chinese from retaining Chinese
citizenship, Beijing has seriously
attempted to lay to rest the "overseas
Chinese bogey" once for all. Nonetheless
this is an historical burden not just on
China but also on the states in Southeast
Asia, and more time is needed to take it
off from their back.
Political and Ideological DiIn~nsions
Foreign economic relations even among
states based on similar economic and
social systems are seldom confined to
pure economic affairs alone. They are
likely to be the outcome of politics inter-
acting with economics [Spero 1985].
The elements of politics are even stronger
in a relationship involving a socialist and
a non-socialist economy because the state
apparatus in the socialist economy is
involved in every aspect of its external
operations.6)
In its dealing with the smaller states
to its south, China is apt to be influenced
by some dominant geo-political con-
siderations. But such considerations were
not apparent in China's traditional re-
5) See "China to Bar the Holding of Dual
Nationality," Straits Times. Singapore.
September 3, 1980.
6) See, e.g., Wiles [1968]; and Wilcznyski
[1969].
lationship with the ASEAN states in the
past because China was then too weak to
conduct its independent foreign economic
policy. Following the formation of the
People's Republic of China in 1949,
however, the pattern of Sino-ASEAN
relations took a radical turn as complex
political and ideological factors came into
play. The New China, marked by a
strong revolutionary impulse and the
proselytising Marxist-cum-Maoist ideol-
ogy, soon came to be perceived by some
ASEAN countries as threat, real or
imagined, to their own security. This
gave rise to two decades of Cold War
relations between China and ASEAN,
with a lot of twists and turns. Their trade
patterns and other forms of contacts were
accordingly distorted. It was not till the
early 1970s with the advent of detente to
the region, sparked off by President
Nixons's visit to Beijing, that individual
ASEAN countries started their long and
often tortuous course of normalization of
relations with China.
Apart from international detente, do-
mestic developments in China has also
contributed to the drastic change in
China's overall relations with ASEAN.
After the fall of the "Gang of Four" in
1975, Beijing started to re-emphasize
economic growth and launched the Four-
Modernization Programme. Accordingly,
economic and social liberalization
measures were introduced. The most
important shift was the move from the
Mao's autarkic line of "self reliance" to
the "open-door" policy in order to allow
the Chinese economy to enter into greater
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interaction with the world economic
forces in terms of foreign trade and foreign
investment. After the return to power of
Mr. Deng Xiaoping in 1978, the open-up
process was further intensified, culmi-
nating in the introduction of vigorous
economic reforms in late 1984 and the
extension of the "SpeCial Economic Zone"
sector in early 1985.7) But the transfor-
mation in recent years was not just con-
fined to the economic sectors: it has
indeed spilled over to every aspect of life
in China. In fact, the changes have been
so drastic as to touch off student unrest in
December 1986, leading to the downfall
of the Chinese Communist Party's
General Secretary, Mr. Hu Yaobang. The
event signalled for a slower tempo of
reforms and liberalization rather than a
return to the old Maoist policy line. The
reforms have simply gone so far that it is
not possible for China to reverse them.
Such sentiments were amply reflected in
the Sixth National People Congress held
in April 1987.
Suffice it to say that China today has
gone a long way in its political, economic
and social liberalization, providing it
with the flexibility needed to engage in
constructive dialogue, or to enter into
serious development cooperation, with
the ASEAN states on a non-ideological
basis. Accordingly the evolving Sino-
ASEAN economic relationship has all the
promises of operating on fresh assump-
7) For brief backgrounds to the recent economic
reforms in China, see Xu Dixin et. ai. [1982];
Feuchtwang and Hussain [1983]; and Wang
[1982].
tions to be largely free from their
past political-cum-idological implications.
How will the ASEAN states respond to
the new trends in China? What will be
the shape of China's emerging relation-
ship with the ASEAN region? It is
necessary to go back into the historical
background of China's bilateral relations
with the individual ASEAN states from
1949 onwards, when the New China
began to exert its geo-political influence
on the region.
Among the ASEAN countries, Indo-
nesia has certainly had the unique ex-
perience with China spreading over three
decades. Indonesia was the first country
in the region to recognize the People's
Republic of China right after it was
proclaimed in October 1949. During
Sukarno's "Guided Democracy," China
had developed a close relationship with
Indonesia, marked by frequent visits of
dignitaries as well as exchange of visits by
Heads of State from both sides. In fact,
China and Indonesia at the zenith of
their intimate relationship in the middle
.of 1965 actually came close to forming a
sort of "Beijing-]akarta Axis. "8)
But Beijing little realized that its ap-
parent solidarity with the Sukarno regime
was actually built upon a soft foundation,
which had all along been plagued by the
continuing rivalry between the Indo-
nesian Communist Party (Partai Kom-
munis Indonesia, or PKI) and the Indo-
nesian army. China also had to deal with
the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, which
8) For an excellent analysis of Sino-Indonesian
relations during this period, see Mozingo
[1976].
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became a political liability for both
Beijing and Sukarno. In the event, the
Beijing-Jakarta alliance was brought to a
violent end by Gestapu, the September
1965 coup in Indonesia. The coup pro-
vided the Indonesian army an excellent
chance to seize power and liguidate the
PKI by force; but it also led to the sus-
pension of the formal diplomatic relations
between China and Indonesia.
Today, some two decades on, Indo-
nesia has not re-opened its -severed diplo-
matic ties with China. In 1971, following
the first signs of Sino-American rap-
proachement, Indonesia's then Foreign
Minister, Adam Malik, declared that
Indonesia would also welcome restoration
of relations with China and was taking
certain initiatives towards that end.
Quring the past decade and a half, there
were a number of occasions when Jakarta
could have mended ties with Beijing; but
each time the chance was deliberately
allowed to slip by.g) The latest occasion
for such a rare opportunity to arise was in
April 1985 when Chinese Foreign Min-
ister, Wu Zueqian, went to Indonesia for
the 30th Anniversary Commemorative
meeting of the Bandung Conference. But
Indonesia's President Suharto chose only
the resumption of direct trade with
China, not the re-establishment of di-
plomatic relations. IO) By early 1987, even
the powerful security quarter, which.
hitherto was most vocal in opposing to
9) For a detailed analysis of the Sino-Indonesian
diplomatic impasse, see Wong [1984].
10) See "Wu-ing Suharto." Far Eastern Economic
Review. May 23, 1985.; also, Asian Wall Street
Journal. May 22, 1985.
the normalization of relations with China
for its alleged complicity in the 1965
abortive coup, conceded that the time was
ripe for such normalization. ll) But Presi-
dent Suharto is still adamant on this
issue.I2) Consequently, Indonesia remains
virtually the only major Third World
country without an official representative
in Beijing, which is a kind of anomaly by
itself.
In July 1985 the Indonesian govern-
ment issued the Presidential Decree
(Inpres No. 9/1985) to officially endorse
the resumption of direct trade between
Indonesia and China which was nego-
tiated by the Indonesian Chamber of
Commerce and Industry (KADIN) and
the China Council for the Promotion of
International Trade (CCPIT).I3) Jakarta's
move was in part a response to the
economic need of diversifying its non-oil
exports, including the development of
new markets with the socialist economies.
According to the Indonesian figures,
Indonesia officially exported US$ 8 mil-
lion in goods to China in 1984 and
imported $224 million, largely through
Hong Kong. But the actual total two-
way trade for 1984 could be $500 mil-
11) See "Indonesia Will Not Renew China
Ties." Straits Times. Singapore. March 28,
1987.
12) During the recent election campaign, officials
of the small Democratic Party of Indonesia
demanded government to review its China
policy. But the chairman of Indonesia's ruling
Golkar, Mr. Sudharmono, declared that the
new cabinet to be appointed in 1988 would
not change its existing China policy. Straits
Times. April 18, 1987.
13) For more discussion of the recent trade re-
lations between China and Indonesia, see
Hadi Soesastro [1986] .
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lion. 14) After the exchange of trade
missions in the middle of 1985, both sides
agreed on the further increases in their
direct trade. Sino-Indonesian relations
have now developed in the direction
where economic relations are taking pre-
cedence over political relations, with the
importance of formal diplomatic links
being relegated.
In contrast, the Philippines and Thai-
land took a different approach to China.
Both have strong historical ties with
China, and both are geographically
closer to China. But both took a hard-
line policy towards China after its Com-
munist revolution. As a truly close anti-
Communist ally of the U ni ted States dur-
ing the Cold War period, the Philippines
had refused to have any form of contact
with any socialist country. Prior to 1971,
the Philippines showed no records of
direct trade with China. The detente,
though slow in coming, actually moved
fast. In 1971, President Marcos signed
the Presidential Executive Order No.
384 to legalize trade with socialist coun-
tries. Scarcely four years later, China rose
to become one of the top ten trade part-
ners of the Philippines. The final impetus
for the Philippines to conclude rapproche-
ment with China came from the drastic
change in Indochina. Less than two
months after the fall of Vietnam, 11arcos
was in Beijing to formalize diplomatic
ties with China. Ever since the Philippines
have been on cordial terms with China.t5)
14) See "Jakarta Ponders Push for Peking Trade."
Asian Wall Street Journal. August 23-24, 1985.
15) See Wong [1984] for detailed discussion of
Sino-Philippine relations.
In recent years, there has been hardly
even a ripple in the Sino-Philippine
relationship, in part because the Philip-
pines was too preoccupied with its own
internal crises due to economic recession
and political transition.
Thailand was another "late developer"
of detente with China; but the normali-
zation process, sparked off by China's
"Ping Pong Diplomacy," also produced
quick results on trade. All through the
1950s and the 1970s, Thailand, which
played host to the Southeast Asian Treaty
Organization, was a firm supporter of
the American policy of "containing
China." Trade with China was officially
banned by Field Marchall Sarit Thanat's
1958 Decree No. 53. The single most
important event that had precipitated
Thailand's decision to finalize diplomatic
ties with China was also the political
transformation of Indochina. Following
the steps of Marcos, Thailand's Prime
Minister Kukrit Pramoj went to Beijing
to conclude diplomatic relations with
China on July 1,1975,16)
Thailand of all the ASEAN countries
currently enjoys the best relations with
China. As a frontline state facing the
expansionist Vietnam, Thailand happens
to share China's similar strategic appre-
hension over Vietnam. Apart from
sending arms to Thailand, China even
pledged to defend Thailand should
she be attacked by Vietnam.17 ) On the
16) See Wong [1984] for detailed discussion of
Sino-Thai relations.
17) Chinese Army Commander General Yang
Dezhi made such a statement during his
recent visit to Thailand. "Pledge from China
to Defend Thailand." Straits Times. January
19, 1987.
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economic front, however, Thailand's
trade with China in recent years has
hit a snag, not just because its growth
has come near to the saturation point in
its present context, but also because it
has run into structural imbalance for
Thailand. With the exception of 1977
and 1982, when China imported large
amounts of Thailand's foodstuffs, the
trade balance has been consistently in
China's favour, mainly as a result ofThai-
land's importation of the high-valued
petroleum products from China.18)
In a different way, both Malaysia and
Singapore have their own distinctive
features in their past relations with China.
Malaysia was the first ASEAN country to
begin thawing its Cold War relationship
with China, a process started soon after
its politically perceptive Prime Minister
Tun Abdul Razak put forth in 1970 his
celebrated concept of establishing South-
east Asia as a zone of peace and neu-
trality. This can be seen from the fact that
Malaysia established full diplomatic re-
lations with China in 1974, ahead of the
Philippines and Thailand, and indepen-
dent of the political developments in
Indochina. Malaysia's initiative towards
China was all the more significant if it
were put in the context of their past
mutual suspicion, recrimination and an-
tagonism, including a short-lived ban on
Chinese imports. It may be remembered
that Malaysia had been the direct target
of the armed Communist insurgency,
which was indirectly supported by
18) See "Solution Sought to Sino-Thai Trade
Gap," Nation. Bangkok. July 1, 1985.
Beijing.
However, Malaysia's overall relations
with China after normalization have not
really taken off into the "warm" level
which has presently characterized China's
relations with the Philippines and Thai-
land. This is mainly because the Sino-
Malaysian relationship has often been
unfortunately drawn into the context of
Malaysia's internal security concerns,
with Kuala Lumpur still harbouring
suspicion on Beijing for not cutting clean
its party-to-party links with the banned
Communist Party of Malaya. China has
long ceased to provide material support
for the CPM but is still relunctant to
officially withdraw the remaining moral
support for the CPM. Chinese leaders
visiting Kuala Lumpur have repeatedly
defended the Chinese position that such
moral support is not on an officialgovern-
ment level. l9)
Singapore was part of Malaysia until
their separation in 1965. All along,
Singapore's overall relations with China
have been and will continue to be in-
fluenced by a set of conflicting forces. As
a globally-oriented city-state, dependent
on open trade for its main livelihood,
Singapore has to be pragmatic in its ap-
proach to foreign policy. I t is therefore
inclined to cultivate good working re-
lationship with any country of any
ideological shade, provided it could lead
19) The latest statement by high-level Chinese
official to this effect was made by China's
Vice-Premier Tian Jiyun during his visit to
Malaysia in October 1986. "Beijing Will Not
Interfere, KL Told." Straits Times. October
16, 1986.
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to further trade growth or wider business
contact for Singapore. This has shaped
Singapore's commercial policy on China,
as it has on other socialist countries. On
the other hand, as a predominantly
Chinese city-state, Singapore has to be
wary of the political sensitivity of its
ASEAN neighbours in its dealings with
China. Politically, insofar as bilateral
relations with China is concerned, Singa-
pore cannot be ahead of the other ASEAN
countries. Hence the Singapore govern-
ment has openly declared that it will be
the last ASEAN country to recognize
Beijing. In July 1981, Singapore only
exchanged trade representatives with
China, thus technically confining the
relationship to a kind of "half-relations."
In deliberately limiting its political re-
lations with China to less than the full
ambassodoriallevel, Singapore was clearly
acting "out of respect for Indonesia,"20)
which has not yet resumed full diplomatic
links with Beijing.
In the area of economic relations with
China, Malaysia and Singapore present
an even sharper contrast to the other
ASEAN countries. For the past three
decades, Malaysia and Singapore have
been the mainstay of China's overall
trade with the ASEAN region. There
were times in the past when China's
trade with the region was virtually
confined to only Malaysia and Singapore,
as direct trade with the other ASEAN
countries was either banned or reduced to
a trickle by the Cold War politics. In
20) See Business Times. Kuala Lumpur. July 9,
1981.
1985, long after China has resumed direct
trade with the individual ASEAN coun-
tries, the combined share of Malaysia
and Singapore still accounted for some
70% of China's total trade with the
ASEAN region as a whole.
Specifically for Singapore, uninhibited
by political and ideological rigidity, it has
responded swiftly to the recent resurgence
of the Chinese economy. Since 1984 the
Singapore government has been taking
measures to clear the deck for a more
prominent economic involvement with
China. Thus travels to China were
relaxed, and trade and investment in
China encouraged, with a number of
government-controlled companies ag-
gressively pushing into the China mar-
ket.2D Recent economic recession in
Singapore has also provided a "push"
factor for the Singapore businessmen to
look to China for the new opportunity.
I t was reported that since 1979 Singapore
businessmen have been involved in about
100 investment projects in China, vari-
ously estimated to amount to some S$900
million.22) Singapore, taking advantage
of its cultural and linguistic affinity, is
seeking to develop itself as another gate-
21) E.g. Intraco, Keppel, Sembawang, and the
Port of Singapore Authority are now involved
in the China market. See "Singapore to Get
More Chinese Business." Straits Times. May
1, 1985.
22) See "Singapore Pushes to Raise China Trade."
Asian Wall Street Journal. September 7, 1985.
But according to the official figures recently
released by BG Lee Hsien Loong, Minister of
Trade and Industry, about 90 Singapore-
based companies had corrunitted about US$
200 million in China by the end of 1986.
Straits Times. March 25, 1987.
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way to China after Hong Kong.
EconoInic Foundation
I
As can be seen from the above, history
and politics have been powerful agents
in the growth and change of the overall
Sino-ASEAN relations in the past. For
the future, however, the underlying
economic and structural factors will
exert greater influence on the pattern of
Sino-ASEAN economic relations. This
has already become a clear trend. China's
relations with most countries are already
normalized, and her international re-
lations are conducted increasingly on a
pragmatic basis. The emerging Sino-
ASEAN economic relationship will there-
fore depend more on the structural char-
acteristics of both Chinese and ASEAN
economies.
In many ways the Chinese economy
stands in sharp contrast to the ASEAN
economies. China is a vast, continental-
sized country with one billion population.
China operates a socialist system and its
economy is supposed to be based on
central planning. The Chinese economy
IS also inherently inward-looking, a
feature partly due to its vast physical size
and partly due to its socialist economic
structure. Consequently, China has never
been a great trading nation, despite its
apparently huge market potentials. In
1984, for instance, China's world share of
exports amounted to only 1.2°1<>; its
trade-GNP ratio, 180/0; and its per-capita
trade turnover, US$49, which were
among the lowest in the Third World and
certainly well below the ASEAN's levels.
In contrast, the ASEAN countries,
with the exception of Indonesia, are gen-
erally small- to- medium-sized countries,
with their economies primarily func-
tioning on the free enterprise basis. The
ASEAN economies are also open and
outward-looking by nature, with foreign
trade and foreign investment playing a
crucial role in their economic growth.
The ASEAN economies, except for the
city-state Singapore, are generally known
to be resource-based, with primary pro-
ducts constituting the mainstay of their
exports. Further, the ASEAN economies
have established close linkages with the
advanced capitalist economies and this
has made it possible for ASEAN to
capture the forces of international capi-
talism for its own economic growth.23>
Table 1 summarizes the basic economic
performance indicators of China and
ASEAN. It can be seen that both China
and the ASEAN economies except the
Philippines have enjoyed high economic
growth during 1973-84, caused, among
other factors, by their high savings and
investment rates. But the per-capita
income of China, at US$ 310, is by far
lower than that of all the ASEAN coun-
tries. It may be stressed that the con-
ventional GNP measures are inherently
biased against a socialist economy with
a large segment of non-market activities
and an undervalued service sector, so
that the real material content of the
Chinese GNP should be much higher
23) For a further discussion of the structure of
these economies, see Wong [1979].
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than it is indicated in Table 1. The point
nonetheless remaIns that the Chinese
economy during the Maoist era has not
emphasized economic growth as much as
other non-economIC goals. In fact, the
recogni tion of this very fact has actually
prompted the post-Mao Chinese leader-
ship to step up the economic moderni-
zation drive. Furthermore, the pro-
growth strategy adopted by China IS
bearing results, as manifested in China's
impressive growth performance in recent
years: 12.30/0 for 1985 and 9.3°tlo for 1986.
This contrasts sharply with the recent
stagnation of the ASEAN economies,
which were hit by the pnmary com-
modity slump.
If China continues to pursue the open-
door economic policy, it is bound to alter
the structure and pattern of the Sino-
ASEAN economic relationship. An eco-
nomically resurgent China could offer
new opportunities to ASEAN as well as
produce negative economic spillovers on
the region as a whole, especially in the
short run. This means that the evolving
Sino-ASEAN economIC relationship IS
going to be a "dynamic" one based on the
interaction of the competitive and com-
plementary forces.
The way by which the Chinese econ-
omy interacts with the ASEAN econo-
mIes IS manifested In their respective
world trade patterns as tabulated In
Table 2. It can be seen that the share
of ASEAN in China's total trade in 1985
was quite important: 10.30/0 for exports
and 6.80/0 for imports. The proportions
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-Table 2 Trade Patterns of China and ASEAN, 1985 (% Distribution)
Grand Total Industrial Countries Asian' Other Rest of ASEAN minusExports China ASEAN Socialist
US$ million % Total USA Japan EEC NICs Countries the World Singapore
China 27,329 100 41.7 8.5 22.3 8.4 - 10.3 27.1 7.4 13.5 2.8
ASEAN
Indonesia 18,330 100 80.0 22.7 49.1 6.6 0.8 7.9 4.8 0.5 6.0
Malaysia 15,408 100 54.6 12.8 24.6 14.4 1.0 25.6 7.2 1.4 10.2
Philippines 4,614 100 73.7 36.2 19.0 14.0 1.8 11.5 5.7 0.8 6.5
Singapore 22,808 100 46.5 21.2 9.4 10.6 1.5 21.9+ 7.7 1.3 21.1
- •Thailand 7,170 100 56.4 19.6 13.4 18.9 3.8 6.5 5.9 1.4 26.0 ~
- ~
Brunei 2,534 100 68.3 * 67.0 1.2 1.6 20.8 7.1 - 2.2 - ~.~
- .~0 Imports(X)




Indonesia 9,321 100 77.2 14.4 28.1 21.7 2.0 6.8 3.7 0.2 10.1 ~
Malaysia 12,301 100 61.5 15.3 23.0 14.4 2.0 22.4 3.9 0.4 9.8
Philippines 5,351 100 53.8 25.1 14.0 8.5 5.4 11.0 7.9 0.3 21.6
Singapore 26,237 100 49.0 15.2 17.1 11.3 8.6 18.0+ 3.5 0.2 20.7
Thailand 9,409 100 59.7 11.2 26.0 16.4 2.4 17.9 3.1 0.7 16.2
Brunei 749 100 43.3 7.5 13.4 18.6 * 49.3 2.3 - 5.1
Note: * Amounts not significant
• Asian NICs here only include Hong Kong and S. Korea
+ Excludes Singapore's trade with Indonesia
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1986.
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Hong Kong were taken into consider-
ation. But even at this level the trade is
quite important for China, especially
SInce the balance of this trade is invari-
ably in China's favour. The ASEAN
markets have always been a significant
outlet for Chinese merchandise, from
traditional foodstuffs to various kinds of
household goods and tools, low-priced
garments, and textile piece-goods.
For ASEAN, the share of China in its
total direct trade (minus re-exports via
Hong Kong and Singapore, etc.) in 1985
ranged from 3.8% for Thailand to 0.8%
for Indonesia for exports, and from 8.6°1<>
for Singapore to 2.0% for Indonesia for
imports. For some ASEAN countries,
their China trade is no longer small. In
future, it can also play a potentially
important role in meeting their efforts of
diversifying their excessive dependence
on the industrial countries.
Table 3 brings out the special feature
of heavy commodity concentration in the
Sino-ASEAN trade. ASEAN's exports to
China are understandably made up of
Table 3 Commodity Structure of China's Trade with ASEAN Countries Showing Primary-Product
Concentration
Indonesia's Exports to ChinaIndonesia's Imports from China
1974- 1977 1978 1984
Rice 55.0 41.2 19.2 Coffee
Sugar & honey 40.0 0.3 7.1 Plywood










Thailand's Imports from China
Singapore's Imports from China
Malaysia's Imports from China
1975 1978 1982 1984
47.2 49.7 38.3 40.4
(27.6) (27.0) (3.2) (3.1 )
Philippine's Imports from China
1976 1977 1982 1985







Malaysia's Exports to China
94.1
Philippine's Exports to China
1976 1977 1982 1985
58.6 65.9 59.3 38.5
Singapore's Exports to China
1976 1980 1984 1985
39.0 41.6 29.7 6.9
Thailand's Exports to China
1976 1979 1982 1985
47.7 29.0 36.7





















Sources: For Indonesia, Impor and Ekspor; for Malaysia, Perdagangan Luar; for the Philippines, Foreign
Trade Statistics of the Philippines; for Singapore, Singapore Trade Statistics; for Thailand, Trade
Statistics of Thailand; all relevant years.
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predominantly primary commodities. For
years, Malaysia's exports to China have
consisted of virtually nothing but rubber.
Sugar is an important item in the Philip-
pines' and Thailand's exports to China,
and so on. To be economically more
closely integrated with the ASEAN
region, China needs to meet the market
requirements of ASEAN by importing
more of its primary products. So far
primary commodities have dominated
Chinese imports from ASEAN. In future,
further industrialization progress in China
should increase the Chinese demand for
more primary commodities from the
region. This appears to be happening
now.
It may be noted that China is also an
important primary-exporting country,
e.g., petroleum to the Philippines and
Thailand, and rice to Malaysia. In
general, Chinese exports of these primary
commodities do not constitute any
menace to ASEAN's own primary exports
on the whole, as ASEAN has a stronger
comparative advantage over China in
the natural resource area. Rather, it is
more in the area of trade in manu-
factured products that ASEAN is apt to
be apprehensive of rising competitive
pressures from China. Currently both
China and ASEAN are intent on stepping
up their industrialization processes and
potential competition in their manu-
factured exports is therefore likely to be
the most sensitive issue in the future Sino-
ASEAN economic relations.
In future, as China's new industriali-
zation efforts bear fruit, there will be
rapid increases in Chinese manufactured
exports, with two serious implications
for ASEAN. First, there are concerns in
ASEAN over the possibility of China
flooding its low-priced manufactured
products into the region. This would
present serious direct competition to the
local industries in ASEAN, some of
which have barely emerged from the
import substitution phase of industriali-
zation. Secondly, China could appear as
an even more serious threat to ASEAN
by competing indirectly in a third coun-
try market, be it a developing country or
an industrial one. As latecomers, both
China and ASEAN (excepting Singa-
pore) tend to specialize in the simple,
labour-intensive manufactures (e.g., tex-
tiles and clothing), and hence compete
with each other in the slowly expanding
or, in some cases, even contracting export
markets. Attempts by China to enlarge
its market shares for manufactured ex-
ports in the industrial countries will, in
the short run, produce some displacement
effects on ASEAN's own manufactured
exports in those markets, particularly
for such labour-intensive manufactures
as textiles, clothing, and footwear. 24)
This is, however, a "static" way of
interpreting competition. In a "dynamic"
context, the world market is not really a
"zero sum game" in which the expansion
of one country's exports is necessarily
made at the expense of the other's. The
24) Using the constant market share analysis,
Christopher Findlay has shown how China
has intensified its competitive pressures on the
ASEAN economies in their labour intensive
manufactured exports. See Findlay [1986].
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industrialists in ASEAN have to learn to
be efficient and competitive against new
comers: if not China, perhaps India. In
the long run, the ASEAN economies will
still have to adapt themselves to the
shifting comparative advantage In the
world economy by making the transition
to more capital-intensive exports, as it is
taking place now in the NICs (newly
industrializing countries).
A balanced picture should also take
into account some of the long-term posi-
tive effects. A China intent on the pursuit
of orderly domestic economic develop-
ment will be politically a stabilizing
factor to the benefit of the whole Asia-
Pacific region. A prosperous China, with
a market of one billion consumers, need
not be exclusively exploited only by the
industrial countries or by some Asian
NICs like Singapore or Hong Kong.
Some ASEAN countries could also cap-
ture a share of the potential China mar-
ket for their resource-based manufactures.
Such increased mutual econornic gains
will provide stability to the emerging
Sino-ASEAN relations.
References
Elvin, Mark. 1973. The Pattern of the Chinese Past.
London: Methuen.
Fairbank, John. K. 1953. Trade and Diplomacy on
the China Coast. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press.
____, ed. 1968. The Chinese World Order.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University press.
Feuchtwang, Stephan.; and Hussain, Athar, eds.
1983. The Chinese Economic Reforms. New York:
St. Martin's Press.
Findlay, Christopher. 1986. ASEAN and China
Exports of Labour-intensive Manufactures.
ASEAN-Australia Working Papers. No. 20.
(May).
Hadi Soesastro. 1986. Indonesia-China Trade
Relations and the Role of Hong Kong. Jaka-
rta : CSIS. (May).
Ho Ping-Yin. 1935. The Foreign Trade of China.
Shanghai : Commercial Press.
Lim, Linda Y.C.; and Gosling, L.A. Peter, eds.
1983. The Chinese in Southeast Asia,. Vol. 1:
Ethnicity and Economic Activity and Vol. II:
Identity, Culture and Politics. Singapore:
Maruzen Asia.
Mackie, J .A.C., ed. 1976. The Chinese in Indonesia:
Five Essays. Melbourne: Thomas Nelson for
the Australian Institute of International
Affairs.
Mozingo, David. 1976. Chinese Policy Towards
Indonesia 1949-1967. Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
sity Press.
Purcell, Victor, 2nd ed. 1965. The Chinese in South-
east Asia. London: Oxford University Press.
Spero, Joan Edleman. 3rd ed. 1985. The Politics of
International Economic Relations. London:
George Allen and Unwin.
Suryadinata, Leo. 1978. Pribumi Indonesians, the
Chinese Minority and China. Kuala Lumpur :
Heinemann Educational Books.
Wang, George C., ed. 1982. Economic Ref07m in the
PRC. Boulder, Colorado: Westviw Press.
Wang Gungwu. 1968. Early Ming Relations with
Southeast Asia: A Background Essay. in The
Chinese World Order, edited by John K. Fair-
bank.
Wilcznyski, J. 1969. The Economics and Politics of
East- West Trade. London: Macmillan Press.
Wiles, P.J.D. 1968. Communist International Eco-
nomics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wong, John. 1979 (3rd printing, 1983). ASEAN
Economies in Perspective: A Comparative Study of
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore
and Thailand. London: Macmillan Press.
____. 1984. The Political Economy of China's
Changing Relations with Southeast Asia. London:
Macmillan Press.
Xu Dixin et al. 1982. China's Search for Economic
Growth. Beijing : New World Press.
-111- 411
